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Introduction 
 
This paper challenges the binaristic approaches to understanding Muslim 
women’s subjectivities as either pious subjects or as Westernised, secular 
feminists. In Pakistan, this binary is present in the discourse of various 
political parties and is reflected in the media as well. More subtly, it is 
often reproduced within scholarship about women, which, by focusing on 
either self-professed secular feminists or explicitly Islamist women’s 
groups, ends up reinforcing the notion that women must fall into one or 
the other camp. This raises serious concerns for us as feminist scholar-
activists because it has limited the public debate around women’s issues. 
In the context of heightening sensitivities around the question of religion, 
it has also led some external development actors to fund faith-based 
organisations and support informal cultural institutions, which contributes 
to making such bodies appear more relevant and authentic at the expense 
of rights-based initiatives.  
 
This binary can be traced to the reification of the category of religion in 
the period well before Pakistan’s inception, as colonial discourses 
attempted to solidify religious boundaries in terms of their depiction and 
strategies of rule vis-à-vis ‘the natives’ (Pandey, 1992; Ludden, 1993; 
Kaviraj, 1994; Oberoi, 1994). These framings were reinforced by 
indigenous Hindu and Muslim elites as part of religious revivalist 
movements that emerged in the decades preceding independence 
(Robinson, 1974; Metcalf, 1993; Mayaram, 2004). However, the 
secular/religious distinction has evolved and been reinforced in recent 
decades following the growth of Islamist movements worldwide and in 
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Pakistan in particular since the 1980s and following the global war on 
terror post 9/11.   
  
The solidification of this binary must be understood within the wider 
political history of Pakistan where the state has played a defining role in 
cultivating the notion that a foreign, ‘Western’ hand has had a suspicious 
role to play in fostering corrupt, secular, and liberal values amongst some 
women, who benefit from donor funds as they run their fundamentally un-
Islamic (read ‘anti-state’) NGOs (Khan, 2001). This is in contrast to the 
state’s historical elevation of religious parties, which are often used to lend 
credence to military rule in the name of Islamisation (Nasr, 1994). With the 
support of the United States, the Pakistani state supported the use of 
jihadi ideology during the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan during the 
1980s. It also allowed Arab funds to flow unchecked into a burgeoning 
madrassa (religious seminary) sector to support these policies (ICG, 2007; 
Dreyfuss, 2005). 
  
Further, the state has consistently sidelined moderate Islamic ulema and 
academics, for example, forcing out of the Council of Islamic Ideology, and 
country, the internationally acclaimed modernist Islamic scholar Fazlur 
Rahman in 1969 (Noorani, 2014) and the liberal scholar Javed Ahmed 
Ghamidi in 2010 (Walsh, 2011). Whether within the state apparatus or in 
public discourse such as television channels, the space for moderate and 
modernist interpretations of Islam is virtually blocked. These processes 
have strengthened right-wing ideologies in the country as a whole and 
marginalised both leftist and liberal voices, including those of women’s 
rights activists. 
  
Most of the academic literature on women’s activism in Pakistan since the 
1990s inadvertently reflects this binary, falling into one of two camps: 
writings produced about the self-identified women’s movement, focusing 
largely on the Women’s Action Forum (WAF), and research on Islamist 
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women’s groups. The former body of scholarship highlights the narratives 
of those activists who largely identify as ‘secular’ and ‘feminist’. Much of 
this work has been written by members of the WAF themselves and 
highlights their efforts to resist the Islamisation policies introduced under 
the dictator, Zia ul Haq (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987; Khan, Saigol, and Zia, 
1994; Shaheed et al., 1998; Saigol, 2016). The latter studies emerged more 
recently (Iqtidar, 2011; Jamal, 2013; Mushtaq, 2010; Ahmad, 2010) and 
examine women in religious political parties such as Jamaat-i-Islami or the 
Islamic academy for women, Al-Huda. This research builds upon a wider 
body of international scholarship that is concerned with understanding the 
subjectivities and agency of Muslim women in various contexts (Abu-
Lughod, 2013; Mahmood, 2005). It is largely produced by scholars either 
from, or trained in, universities in Europe and North America, many of 
whom are influenced by poststructuralist approaches and operate within 
a context of increasing Islamophobia inside and outside of the academy. 
While their critiques emerge from their particular positionalities within 
Western academia, their influence has travelled far beyond its borders, 
inadvertently contributing to efforts to delegitimise local rights-based 
activists.  
  
One of the detrimental effects of this binaristic approach has been to 
perpetuate the notion that feminism is a Western import and that an 
‘authentic’, culturally sensitive and hence more effective approach to 
gender-based development interventions must operate within a religious 
framework. Thus some donor agencies increasingly support initiatives 
framed in religious terms, which engage with local ‘religious’ and 
‘traditional’ actors, thus sidelining and de-legitimising women’s and other 
civil society groups operating within a rights-based framework. 
  
This paper begins with an overview of the literature produced thus far on 
women’s activism in Pakistan over the past three decades. This includes a 
discussion of the writings and activism of the self-identified women’s 
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movement, particularly related to the question of the movement’s 
engagement with religion written largely during the 1980s and 1990s. This 
is followed by an exploration of the scholarship produced on the activism 
and organisations of Islamist women and the women’s piety movement 
more recently in the period following 9/11. This literature represents a 
shift within the scholarship, from highlighting the work of feminist activists 
to reflecting scholars’ increased curiosity about the subjectivity and 
organisation of Islamist women. This shift is further reflected in donor 
policies which increasingly fund faith-based initiatives. 
  
We then turn our attention to more recent examples of gender activism 
that do not conform to the rigid religious/secular binary. This includes the 
struggle amongst peasant women in Okara, the movement for the rights 
of lady health workers, women’s activism in the conflict- affected north-
west, and transgender rights activism. These cases highlight the diverse 
and vibrant nature of gender activism, generated spontaneously and 
without the direct engagement of either the women’s movement or pious 
women’s groups/religious parties, both of whom represent particular 
middle to upper class interests and contestations generated within the 
context of increasing Islamisation (Khan, 1994). These cases demonstrate 
that while the self-identified secular women’s movement may have 
declined in recent years in numbers and influence, and Islamist women’s 
groups opposed to gender equality may be expanding in size and scope 
(Jamal, 2005; 2009; 2013; Iqtidar, 2011; Ahmad, 2010), gender activism 
continues in multiple forms across the country that exceeds the confines 
of the religious/secular binary. Understanding these diverse forms of 
gender activism allows for a more complex and nuanced view of gender 
politics within a variety of contexts, challenging the state and other actors 
seeking to address women’s issues in Pakistan. 
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Discourse on Women’s Rights Activism 
  
The contemporary women’s movement emerged during the 1980s, when 
Pakistan witnessed a dramatic political and cultural shift rightward due to 
military dictator Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation programme, which focused to a 
great extent on the control and regulation of issues related to gender and 
sexuality.1 Zia’s government introduced the Hudood Ordinances, which 
included punishments such as amputations, public whippings, and stoning 
to death as part of the formal criminal justice system. These ordinances 
also criminalised consensual sex (zina) between unmarried women and 
men and made it necessary for a woman to produce four male witnesses 
in order to prove that she had been raped; if she was unable to do so, she 
could be charged with committing zina, the maximum punishment for 
which is death by stoning (Shaheed, 2010). The government also 
introduced the Law of Evidence in 1984, making the financial testimony of 
two women or two non-Muslim men equal to that of one Muslim man. 
Islamisation included a range of measures to control women’s mobility 
and dress, such as mandatory headscarves for those working in 
government offices or appearing on television, and a ban on women’s 
participation in certain mixed public events such as spectator sports 
(Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987). The aim was to push women back into the 
confines of the chador and chardiwari (the veil and the four walls of the 
home), thus marking women’s bodies as symbols of the Islamic nation. The 
contemporary women’s movement emerged from within this context of 
Islamisation. Hence, it is no surprise that much of the writing about the 
women’s movement at this time deals with the issue of 
Islamisation/secularism. 
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(WAF Poster. Artist: Lala Rukh) 
WAF, which spearheaded the modern rights-based women’s movement, 
was established in 1981 as a platform to organise against Zia’s Islamisation 
programme. WAF maintained a publicly ambiguous position vis-à-vis its 
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position on religion out of political necessity throughout the 1980s. 
However, they largely chose to work within a universalistic rights-based 
framework. Hina Jilani (1986), prominent human rights lawyer and WAF 
member, explained this choice, arguing that engaging with Islam was 
thought to be futile for activists as Islam contains many schools of thought, 
and it would inevitably be the school favoured by the government that 
would dominate. Similarly, Rubina Saigol said many activists by the late 
1980s realised they would never win if they played on the ‘mullah’s wicket’ 
(Saigol, 2016), that is, by the rules set by conservative religious groups and 
leaders. 
  
However, not all members of the women’s movement agreed. Khawar 
Mumtaz argued that it was impossible not to engage with Islam at the 
time: 
 
We thought the best way of responding was to get progressive 
interpretations of Islam given that context, given the nature of the 
law, and given at the time it was an Islamic, very conservative 
religious government and military government that had imposed 
the law. The parameters were in a sense defined. (Interview, 11 May 
2011) 
 
For this reason, throughout the 1980s, WAF periodically engaged with 
religious scholars and texts in order to prove that laws passed during 
Islamisation such as the Hudood Ordinances, the law of Qisas and Diyat, 
and the Law of Evidence, were in fact fundamentally un-Islamic (Mumtaz 
and Shaheed, 1987). However, differences of opinion over the strategic 
use of religion remained throughout the 1980s, and were one of the 
reasons for WAF’s brief split within its Lahore chapter. WAF officially 
declared it stood for a separation of religion and state during its 1991 
convention (Shaheed et al., 1998). 
  
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
159 Khan and Kirmani. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 151-191 
 
The issue of whether to engage proactively with religious discourses, 
despite WAF’s secular position, was never quite settled within the 
women’s movement. There is a consistent concern amongst some activists 
that a secular approach - one that openly advocates for a separation of 
religion from the state - has been alienating to the vast majority of women 
in Pakistan (Shaheed, 2002). Thus, for practical and strategic reasons, a 
handful have continued to engage with religious texts and scholars 
periodically in order to defend against religious-based justifications for the 
denial of women’s rights (Kirmani, 2013; Bradley and Kirmani, 2015). This 
has also been a strategy for dealing with the frequent charge lobbied 
against them by political parties and the media of being ‘Westernised’ and 
therefore inauthentic (Charania, 2014). For example, some activists from 
the feminist NGO Shirkat Gah provided legislators with religious-based 
arguments against the Hudood Ordinances during the Musharraf regime 
(1999-2008) to support legislative debates leading to the passage of the 
Women’s Protection Act (2006)2 (interview, Khawar Mumtaz). However, 
the use of such arguments has been very limited in practice and even that 
has drawn criticism from some feminists within and outside of the 
movement who argued it was exclusionary with regards to women from 
religious minorities, and played into the hands of right-wing forces 
(Gardezi, 1990; Sumar, 2002; Zia, 2009). 
  
The women’s movement has been prolific in generating research, and 
through its NGO work providing the majority of the discourse and analysis 
that forms the basis of knowledge production about gender in Pakistan. 
While activists have written on the detrimental effects of Islamic laws on 
women (Jahangir and Jilani, 1990), they have also addressed the long-term 
repercussions of Islamisation more broadly. This includes its effects on the 
education curriculum as a whole (Saigol, 1995), the rights of women in the 
context of the judiciary and Shariah courts (Shirkat Gah, 2000), the 
increase in violence against women in the name of culture/customs (Brohi, 
2017; Shah, 2017), and the rise of religious extremism and the Taliban 
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movement in the north-west, which greatly restricted the rights of women 
and girls in the region (Brohi, 2006; Bari, 2010.). 
  
Activists have not limited themselves to contending with the discourse and 
impact of Islamisation alone. They created and led the campaign for the 
restoration of a quota for women in elected assemblies,3 generating the 
knowledge base to support arguments in favour of this and other 
legislative reforms.4 Following a series of weak, civilian governments in the 
post-Zia era (1988-1999), activists produced research that focused on 
increasing women’s political voice and strengthening inclusive democratic 
governance (Shaheed et al., 2009; Zia, 2005; Bari, 2015). They have also 
produced some of the first research and awareness-raising material on 
sexual and reproductive rights (Saeed, 1994),5 environmental issues 
(Sadeque, 2012; Hanif, 2011), and citizen-based initiatives for peace 
between India and Pakistan (Sarwar, 2007). While the movement is 
criticised for its urban middle and upper-class bias, activists have built 
periodic cross-class linkages and supported women in workers’ 
associations, trade unions and rural groups such as the Sindhiani Tehreek 
(Khan and Saigol, 2004) and the Anjuman Muzareen Punjab (see below), 
which they also document.6 
  
Their research has fed into activism and political lobbying, and contributed 
to the movement’s influence despite its limited size. For example, since 
the early 2000s, several pieces of legislation were passed in favour of 
women’s rights. In 2002, the number of reserved seats for women in the 
national and local assemblies was increased, precipitated by Musharraf’s 
strategy of promoting ‘enlightened moderation’. It facilitated the passage 
of a series of women-friendly pieces of legislation in subsequent years, 
including laws related to honour killings, acid attacks, and harmful 
customary practices (Mirza, 2011). Although the women’s movement may 
have waned, dispersed and to a large extent become NGO-ised during the 
1990s - a fate that has befallen women’s movements across the world - 
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women’s rights activists have maintained an impressive influence on 
policy-making and legislative reform (Saigol, 2016). 
  
Despite these gains, moves to protect and promote women’s rights 
continue to be met with consistent opposition from conservative religious 
groups, with support from some parts of the state, such as the Islamic 
Federal Shariat Court (FSC) and the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII).7 For 
example, the FSC ruled in 2010 that some parts of the Women’s Protection 
Act 2006, which amended the Hudood Ordinances, were unconstitutional 
(Butt, The Express Tribune, 23 December 2010). The CII has subsequently 
taken positions in favour of child marriage, against the use of DNA testing 
in rape cases, and against women’s right to object to her husband’s second 
marriage (Ali, Dawn, 11 March 2014; Nangiana, The Express Tribune, 30 
May 2013). Women representatives from influential religious parties, 
although they tacitly supported the women’s movement in its activism to 
oppose the zina laws (Hussein, 2006), joined with their male colleagues in 
the National Assembly to resist the amendments, agreeing it would be 
tantamount to promoting a ‘free-sex zone’ in Pakistan (Pakistan News 
Service, 15 November 2006). This ideologically fraught environment is a 
major reason, despite WAF declaring its secularity in 1991, that women’s 
rights activists rarely if ever openly ‘come out’ as secular in public debates. 
 
Islamist Women’s Subjectivities and the Post-secular Turn  
 
Since the 2000s, there has been a shift within the academic literature on 
women’s activism in Pakistan from a concern with the women’s 
movement to a growing interest amongst scholars in the organisation and 
self-identification of Islamist women’s organisations. This is part of a wider 
trend amongst scholars of gender internationally, particularly those 
focusing on Muslim-majority contexts. These scholars are working within 
the context of an increased deconstruction of the origins of secularism, 
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liberalism, and rights-based discourse - three sets of ideas often viewed as 
interrelated products of the Western Enlightenment. 
  
Within this broader field is a subset of works highly critical of the ways 
Muslim women in particular have been depicted, both within Orientalist 
and Islamophobic discourse produced after 9/11 and within the discourse 
of feminist scholars in the West and Muslim-majority countries 
themselves. Scholars Saba Mahmood (2005) and Lila Abu-Lughod (2013) 
have argued against the determinism that feminism, and liberal feminism 
in particular, has imposed on Muslim women (whether Western or 
‘indigenous’), which they argue essentialises the complexity of Muslim 
women’s lives and is unable to understand forms of agency that do not 
conform to the Western, liberal model of an autonomous subject 
(Mahmood, 2005). These scholars call for approaches that highlight 
Muslim women’s agency and are sensitive to the specificity of their lived 
experiences. This trend within the academy has inspired a burgeoning of 
research on Islamist women’s groups in Pakistan over the past two 
decades. 
  
There are several detailed studies conducted by scholars based in Pakistan 
and in the diaspora that shed light on women’s participation in Islamist 
political parties and movements. Through her research on the Jamaat-e-
Islami (JeI), the largest and oldest religious-based political party in 
Pakistan, Amina Jamal (2005; 2009) has argued that secular feminists in 
Pakistan have failed to grasp the manner in which Islamist women 
negotiate with modernity actively through their political struggles. Her 
work demonstrates how women in the JeI use the language of rights to 
assert their religious identities in the public sphere. In her research on 
Islamist groups, Humeira Iqtidar (2011) also argues that women in the JeI 
and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa8 are asserting their agency through their active 
participation in these groups and they should not be viewed as victims of 
false consciousness, which is often how they are understood by feminist 
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researchers. She takes the argument even further by arguing that the 
political activism of Islamist parties in general may be critical of secularism 
as a project but is actually facilitating secularisation through the 
rationalisation of religion - by bringing religion into the competitive public 
sphere. 
  
Since the 1990s, there has been a growth in women’s piety movements 
across the country, with Al Huda being the largest and most well-known. 
Al Huda is a women’s piety movement founded by Dr Farhat Hashmi in 
1994, which promotes Islamic education for women and follows the 
Wahhabi9 school of thought. Sadaf Ahmad (2010) explores Al Huda’s 
appeals to rationality as a means of garnering support amongst middle- 
and upper-class women through a detailed study of their pedagogical 
methods. Faiza Mushtaq’s (2010) work focuses on the organisational 
strategies of the Al Huda movement and the manner in which its founder, 
Farhat Hashmi, is able to establish her authority, at least amongst a certain 
section of middle to upper class urbanised women in the country. Neelam 
Hussain (2014) too has written about dars10 organisations such as Al Huda 
and Al Noor. She argues that, while participation in dars may be a form of 
agency, this agency will not lead to systemic or long-term change and 
rather reinforces unequal power relations for women. While the foci and 
arguments of each of these authors differs, all of these works are part of a 
wider effort amongst scholars of gender in Pakistan to take the activism of 
Islamist women seriously - something that was felt to be missing within 
the writing of feminist scholars during the 1980s and 1990s. 
  
While the growth in detailed analyses of Islamist women’s activism 
presented in the aforementioned studies deepens our understanding of 
these increasingly influential groups, the fact that this type of literature 
occupies growing space within the discourse on Pakistani women, and that 
research on Pakistani women in general has in many ways moved on from 
the study of feminist women’s organising, raises some concerns. With the 
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focus on Islamist women, there is a danger of falling into the essentialist 
trap that many of these authors are actually aiming to critique - one that 
romanticises the notion of the pious subject and that does not account for 
the ‘messiness’ of identities as they are practiced in everyday life 
(Bangstad, 2011; Zia, 2009). By labelling only particular women ‘pious’ or 
religiously-motivated, namely those who hold conservative views with 
regards to Islam, these studies risk reaffirming the notion that only those 
who hold conservative positions are truly ‘Islamic’ and hence have a right 
to define the realm of religion.  
  
The result of this is the inadvertent recreation of a binary between right-
wing religious women and liberal or left-wing secular women - a divide that 
scholars like Mahmood (2005), who builds on the work of Asad (2003), 
actually aim to undo through their critical work on secularism; hence their 
work remains trapped within the system of binaries that they are actually 
aiming to deconstruct. This is also a distinction that Pakistani women’s 
rights activists (Khan, 1994; Shaheed, 2009) have been actively critiquing 
and resisting even before these studies were published.11 This approach 
can prove problematic for locally-based feminists because of the ever-
increasing political challenges they face directly from Islamist movements, 
which include the female members of these movements (Zia, 2009). 
Further, as the following section demonstrates, the binaristic approach 
has called into question the social or cultural authenticity of women’s 
rights activists, contributing to a change in donor funding approaches. 
  
Faith-based Interventions and the Reification of Culture 
 
In the belief that instrumentalising faith and tradition implies greater 
cultural authenticity, and thereby greater acceptance in an increasingly 
anti-Western milieu, foreign donor agencies have begun to fund faith-
based organisations to defuse potential government hostility and increase 
their acceptance within communities. For example, USAID funded an 
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expensive project to ‘sensitise’ religious leaders to win their support for 
contraceptive use and got a family planning manual approved by the 
controversial CII (Brohi and Zaman, 2016). The WHO and UNICEF invited 
Maulana Sami ul-Haq, widely known for his leadership of a religious 
seminary that trained many Taliban on both sides of the border, to be a 
spokesperson for the polio vaccination campaign in 2015 and 2016.12 
  
External actors such as the UK’s Department for International 
Development and United Nations Development Programme, also support 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms in the conflict-affected 
province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).13 The purpose is to help the 
government reduce the enormous backlog of cases in the formal court 
system, which was viewed as one reason for initial support amongst some 
communities for the Taliban and their form of swift justice. Donor interest 
extends to financial support for government training of jirgas (tribal 
councils) in human rights (Bureau Report, Dawn, 7 December 2013) 
despite the fact they exclude women’s representation and voice. Research 
shows jirgas represent the interests of the male elite and perpetuate 
traditional practices such as honour killings and exchange of girls to settle 
disputes (Shah, 2017). For this reason, they are becoming increasingly 
unpopular (Brohi 2017, pp. 47-8). Some women politicians have called for 
women’s representation on ADR panels and question the enthusiasm 
amongst donors for these mechanisms (Raza, 2017). Further, the women’s 
advocacy coalition Takra Qabailee Khwendo, working in conflict-affected 
tribal areas, rejects these efforts to formalise the all-male jirga councils 
(Shah, 2013). 
  
Farida Shaheed argues the instrumentalisation of religious discourse by 
some NGOs should not be misconstrued, ‘Just because somebody calls 
themselves faith-based does not make them the holders of the truth’.14 
Afiya Zia warns against growing donor support for the ‘theocratization of 
development’, in which rights are framed as negotiable and subject to 
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religious interpretation rather than as clear demands that one can claim 
from the state. If the moral imperative of a universal human rights 
approach is abandoned in favour of faith-based social development, she 
argues, ‘then anything is possible on this slippery slope’ (Zia 2013, pp. 201-
5). 
  
Moving Beyond the Binary: Gender Activism in Multiple Forms 
 
Although the self-identified women’s movement has gradually reduced in 
visibility over the past decades and fragmented as a result of NGO-isation, 
this does not mean that gender-based activism has ceased. In various parts 
of the country, women are pushing back against oppressive forces and 
engaging in collective action in multiple forms - without relying on Islam to 
legitimise or frame their demands. They are doing so in a context where 
public mobilisation and criticism of the state carries great risks. 
  
The last decade has witnessed an increasingly repressive culture of 
silencing all forms of dissent. Vigilante killings, generated by spurious 
charges of blasphemy against targeted individuals, has frightened non-
Muslim religious minorities and silenced dissident intellectuals. Cases of 
enforced disappearances or ‘missing persons’ and extrajudicial killings 
have increased, particularly in FATA15, KP and Balochistan, under the cover 
of national security (HRCP, 2016).16 Among the affectees are not only 
suspected terrorists and criminals, but also those critical of the state. And 
women are not exempt. Karachi lost two prominent women activists in 
recent years, Perween Rahman and Sabeen Mahmud, both outspoken in 
their criticism of powerful interest groups and both murdered in their cars 
under mysterious circumstances.  
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(Aurat March, Karachi, 8 March 2018. Photo: Hum Aurtein) 
 
Despite all of this, gender-based resistance continues in multiple forms 
throughout the country. The following section documents some recent 
instances of activism amongst women and transgender communities that 
persist despite varying degrees of state/military repression. 
 
Punjab Peasants’ Resistance 
Women have had a growing role to play in the peasant struggle which 
began in 2000 for proprietary rights over land owned by the government 
and military in the state of Punjab. Peasants formed a non-violent 
resistance organisation called Anjuman Muzareen Punjab (AMP)17 to resist 
changes from sharecropping to a new contract system for tenant farmers, 
which left them vulnerable to eviction and limited their earnings. They 
rejected the new tenancy terms and demanded ownership rights over the 
land instead. Women wielding thaapas, or sticks, formed groups to protect 
their villages from police action and resist government efforts to force 
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compliance. A female leadership emerged from the peasants’ Christian 
and Muslim communities, both working together to recruit support, block 
highways, stage hunger strikes, attend court hearings and speak at public 
engagements to rally support. As the AMP grew into a movement, women 
were inducted at all levels (Mumtaz and Mumtaz, 2010). 
  
Women’s spontaneous and self-generated involvement in this collective 
action has led to their improved mobility, greater say in domestic decision-
making, reduced domestic violence and an increased desire to educate 
girls (Mumtaz and Mumtaz, 2010). In 2008 they formed a Peasant 
Women’s Society and began to demand land rights for landless women 
peasants, as well as women’s recognition in all property deeds drawn up 
during a government land reforms process (Yusuf, 2016). WAF and 
numerous other civil society organisations support their cause, which also 
receives occasional sympathetic media coverage. Political parties have 
promised to address the peasants’ grievances, yet no elected government 
has yet delivered. 
 
Peasants continue to be arrested on charges they are terrorists and land 
grabbers, indicating institutions of the state, whether government or 
military, are united to ensure the movement’s goals are not met (Our 
Correspondent, The Express Tribune, 2018). In April this year, the Supreme 
Court rejected a petition by an AMP leader, incarcerated for being a 
terrorist and represented initially by women’s and human rights activist 
Asma Jahangir, to be shifted out of solitary confinement. The movement 
has persisted in the absence of substantial backing from political parties, 
external development funding, or recourse to religious/cultural rhetoric, 
demonstrating the strength of their resistance and claims to the land.  
  
Lady Health Workers’ Mobilisation 
The backbone of Pakistan’s primary health care system is a cadre of 
125,000 Lady Health Workers (LHWs) operating in rural and peri-urban 
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communities delivering vaccinations, antenatal screenings, nutrition 
counselling and contraceptives through home visits. Starting in 1994, the 
government programme paid LHWs a nominal sum as contractual workers. 
But as their numbers increased it soon became apparent they were making 
a significant difference to health outcomes, despite inefficiencies in 
management (OPM 2009, pp. 4-8). LHWs were often the main 
breadwinners in their families, and their jobs one of the only forms of non-
agricultural paid work opportunities for women in their villages (Khan, 
2014). 
  
After years of receiving inadequate compensation under insecure work 
conditions, LHWs began to organise sporadic protests and sit-ins around 
the country to draw attention to their delayed and inadequate salaries, 
and demand to become regularised government employees with all 
associated benefits. Their national association made its first significant 
gain when the Supreme Court ordered in 2010 they be paid the minimum 
wage of a skilled full-time worker, a meagre Rs 7,000 (GBP 45) per month 
(Khan, 2011b). Two years later it ordered provincial governments to 
integrate them fully into the service structure. 
  
Along with polio workers, LHWs risk their lives at the hands of militant 
groups. As the Taliban insurgency gained momentum in the aftermath of 
9/11, militants began to abduct and kill LHWs for their involvement in the 
polio campaign, which they maligned as part of a US plot to sterilise 
Muslims. Between 2012-17 at least 22 LHWs were killed (Our 
Correspondent, The Express Tribune, 2017a). Attacks continue in the 
conflict-affected north-west and cities, where militants have a strong 
presence and the government struggles to contain a resurgence of polio. 
  
LHWs are also subject to multiple forms of gender-based discrimination 
and must contend with routine sexual harassment and lack of control over 
their earnings at home. Civil society organisations are now stepping in to 
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highlight their struggles and support their efforts to make sure their voices 
are heard and demands met (Baloch, 2017). LHWs’ mobilisation is possibly 
the most sustained, widespread, and successful example of women-led 
collective action in Pakistan’s recent history, yet somehow their 
endeavour has operated quite independently from the women’s rights 
movement and the NGO sector. 
 
Tribal Women’s Association 
After the military cleared much of the country’s tribal areas on the border 
with Afghanistan from Taliban control, the government initiated a FATA 
reforms process to end the colonial-era rule through Frontiers Crime 
Regulations and mainstreaming the region’s governance and 
administrative structures. With support from another prominent women’s 
NGO in KP, in 2012 the first tribal women’s association was formed, called 
Takra Qabaili Khwendo (TQK). It is a network, bringing together women 
from diverse backgrounds and education levels in FATA. Members employ 
a mix of strategies - workshops, awareness-raising sessions, press 
statements, and political meetings - to ensure women’s voices are heard 
in a context marked by the exclusion and silencing of women in ‘an area 
where political citizenship is barely in its infant steps’, dominated by 
militancy and ‘myriad forms of violent intervention’ (Fleschenberg 2015, 
p. 68). TQK began by presenting their demands to elected politicians; they 
included a government-allocated quota for FATA women within 
parliament (similar to reserved seats for women from other provinces), 
women’s presence in election offices (to offset cultural and political 
controls against women voting), and inclusion in tribal jirgas (Shah, 2013). 
 
The TQK have since shifted their position on jirgas, now rejecting these 
councils altogether because of their patriarchal implications (Shah, 2013). 
They have done so by opposing the government’s proposed Riwaj Act, 
which is intended to be a first step in the FATA reforms process and 
legalises the informal jirga system while at the same time extending 
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jurisdiction of the higher courts to the area (Committee on FATA Reforms, 
2016).18 They demanded to be part of the FATA reforms process, arguing 
the jirga system should be replaced by the formal criminal justice system, 
which recognises women’s civil and political rights (Our Correspondent, 
The Express Tribune, 2016). 
  
Recently tribal women’s groups have been surprised and encouraged by a 
spontaneous youth uprising from FATA with demands similar to their own. 
Known as the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), it is pressing for 
meaningful reforms in FATA, including full integration into the state 
administration and judicial system, recognition of their fundamental 
rights, and an end to excesses by the military forces in their communities. 
Contrary to established patriarchal tradition, PTM leaders have reached 
out to tribal feminist groups and other KP women activists. Many now 
openly support them by attending their rallies and making statements in 
favour of PTM’s goals.19 In response to PTM mobilisation and criticism of 
the military, the government has restricted the group’s right to assembly; 
in a recent crackdown one woman activist from KP was also detained.  
 
Transgender Rights Activism 
The last ten years witnessed a dramatic growth in activism around the 
rights of sexual minorities and transgender communities in particular. 
While the presence of the third gender, or ‘Khwaja Siras’20 as they have 
been come to be legally known in Pakistan, has deep historical roots, the 
rights of Khwaja Siras has only recently emerged as an issue in public 
debates. One of the reasons for this might be the increase in funding for 
HIV/AIDS-related projects, which has benefitted from organising amongst 
sexual minorities across the developing world (Fried & Kowalski-Morton, 
2008).  This has led to the emergence of several NGOs working for the 
rights of the transgender community across the country. 
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A series of Supreme Court rulings between 2009 and 2012 gave legal status 
to members of the Khwaja Sira community. The first major victory for 
Khwaja Siras was the addition of a third gender category in the national 
identity cards in 2011 (Khan, 2011a). This landmark decision, i.e. formal 
recognition of more than two genders, paved the way for recognition of 
other rights such as the right to education, healthcare and a reservation 
for members of the third gender in government jobs. Next, activists came 
together to draft a new law to protect transgender people from any form 
of discrimination or violence based on their gender identity. The Senate 
passed the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill 2017 in March 
2018, which many transgender activists had previously rejected because 
of its problematic definition of ‘transgender’ and its inclusion of medical 
tests as a determinant of transgender identity. However, after lobbying 
with legislators, the Senate passed a bill which does not require medical 
examination to claim transgender status, allows transgender people to 
register for drivers’ licenses and passports, prevents harassment and 
discrimination at multiple levels, includes provisions for transgender 
persons to be provided with loans and employment opportunities, along 
with several other progressive provisions (Guramani, Dawn, 7 March 
2018). 
  
The Khwaja Sira Society in Lahore, GIA in Karachi, Wajood in Islamabad, 
and TransAction in Peshawar are some NGOs slowly gaining prominence 
at the national level. They raise awareness about the rights of members of 
the Khwaja Sira community and work on issues related to health and 
economic justice. In Karachi, activists such as Bindya Rana, have been 
highlighting the neglect of the community by the state for years in terms 
of access to employment and education. In KP, where several incidents of 
violence against the community have surfaced in the news and on social 
media, TransAction lobbies for greater protection from the police (Our 
Correspondent, The Express Tribune, 6 December 2017b). 
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The efforts of transgender rights activists are shaking established gender 
hierarchies at their very foundations. While the presence of Khwaja Siras 
may have a long history in South Asian society, the fact that the majority 
of transgender rights activists are challenging the biological basis of 
sex/gender as it is defined by law opens up space for a reconceptualisation 
of gender itself. At the same time, it must be noted that most activism on 
this issue has taken place by those identified as Khwaja Sira, who either 
identify as a third gender or as trans-women. There is very little advocacy 
by or on behalf of transgender men apart from a select few cases (Khan, 
2009). For the most part, the concept of trans-manhood or gender 
nonconformity still has little or no recognition in the Pakistani context, but 
this has also started changing.21 
  
Conclusion 
  
This paper provides a brief overview of the academic discourse produced 
over the past four decades with regards to Pakistani women’s activism. 
Much of the scholarship about women’s rights activism has come from 
within the women’s movement itself and focused on the negative impact 
of Islamisation on women’s lives, along with a wide range of social, 
economic, and political issues. The movement’s extensive project of 
knowledge production represents their developing and deepening 
understanding of women’s issues since the movement began its resistance 
to Zia’s Islamisation. On the other hand, scholarship produced since the 
early 2000s on women in religious parties and piety movements provides 
insight into the current trend towards religious engagement that is 
arguably sweeping across swathes of middle- and upper-class women. 
Both bodies of work, which sometimes also overlap, have provided key 
insights into the important women’s mobilisations across the politico-
ideological spectrum in Pakistan. 
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However, we contend here this discourse has also inadvertently 
reproduced a restrictive binary distinction between ‘secular’ women’s 
rights activists and ‘religious’ piety movements and women’s wings of 
Islamist political parties, which overlooks the vast array of  gender-based 
social and political activism in recent years. In order to highlight the 
shortcomings of this binary, we draw attention to new sites of activism 
that have emerged which cannot be understood through the narrow prism 
of a binary lens and rely on neither set of discourses. These newer forms 
of mobilisation embed gender justice demands within movements for 
workers’ rights, peasants’ rights, ethnic and gender identity struggles and 
citizenship rights. Hence, they challenge the confines of the 
secular/religious binary as an adequate framework within which to 
comprehend gender justice issues in Pakistan. 
  
Neither the ‘religious’ nor the ‘secular’ activists can lay claim to forging 
deep linkages with more recent forms of gender-based mobilisation such 
as the collective action amongst lady health workers, Punjabi peasants, 
tribal groups, and transgender activists. Islamist women have not 
expressed support or otherwise engaged with these forms of activism as 
their underlying ideology does not challenge existing class, caste, and state 
structures. On the other hand, the engagement of the women’s 
movement with these newer forms of activism has mainly been by way of 
support through NGO networks, legal aid and research, but this has been 
limited and fragmented. However, because the women’s movement 
articulates its demands in the language of citizenship rights, there is more 
scope for a deep engagement with these new sites of activism. The fact 
that this has not yet occurred in any significant or sustained manner 
suggests that the class composition and urban bias of the rights-based 
women’s movement has contributed to a failure to develop deeper 
alliances. This is also a result of the general decline of the public profile of 
the movement since the 1990s. Feminists find themselves in a challenging 
moment; to remain relevant they must build bridges with these newer 
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forms of claims-making in demanding accountability from the state for 
marginalised citizens.  
   
The newer sites of gender-based activism also pose a challenge to donor-
driven faith-based development initiatives, demonstrating that Islam and 
idealised notions of cultural authenticity are neither necessary nor 
relevant to driving these emerging mobilisations; in some cases these 
mobilisations pose a significant challenge to these donor-driven initiatives. 
In particular, in Pakistan’s conflict-affected north-west, the grassroots 
campaign for ethnic Pashtun rights is a demand for citizenship status from 
the state and a rejection of the tribal jirga as means to deliver justice to 
both men and women. Thus, these newer forms of activism demand the 
state be held accountable to ensure citizenship rights and entitlements, in 
effect a rejection of the attempts of some donor agencies to earn 
legitimacy by reifying informal structures and Islam. Since the donors in 
question represent supposedly secular states that are meant to adhere to 
human rights within their own borders, it is all the more unacceptable they 
suspend the same standards in some of their activities in Pakistan. 
 
While these new forms of mobilisation and resistance provide reason for 
hope, the risks of demanding rights for marginalised citizens are growing 
as the state closes spaces for social and political action by incarcerating 
and disappearing activists, holding trials outside the public purview, and 
imposing controls on NGOs in the name of security. This has limited the 
successes of the newer movements and further restricted the space of 
older movements. It has also affected the working of civil society 
organisations, many led by feminist activists, subjecting them to increased 
scrutiny and vetting to ensure they are not functioning to serve ‘Western’ 
interests, or opposed to ‘the [Islamic] ideology of the state’. Thus, the state 
continues to rely on support from Islamists, whose NGOs and seminaries 
operate with relatively little oversight, to selectively circumscribe dissent. 
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The growth and spread of Islamist ideologies, spread via state and non-
state actors, has limited the space for all forms of dissent, including around 
issues related to gender and sexuality.  
  
We have argued that the restrictive secular/religious binary operative in 
Pakistan must be understood within the context of the state’s historic 
instrumentalisation of Islam for its political purposes. Thus an explicitly 
secular, rights-based women’s movement arose in reaction to the state’s 
cultivation of Islamist social and political activism, including amongst some 
groups of women, in order to further its interests. While the binary 
framework has historical relevance for understanding the contestations 
over women’s rights since the 1980s, its instrumental purpose may finally 
be coming to an end. This is made clear by the recent gender-based 
mobilisations that we highlight, each of which demand accountability and 
recognition from the state. The efforts of these groups cannot be 
understood within a simplistic binary framework, and hence cannot be 
dismissed as either a ‘Western’ import nor justified as ‘faith-based’. These 
emerging mobilisations demonstrate that while older spaces of feminist 
activism may be shrinking, newer spaces are being forged. Hence, this is a 
moment that is filled with transformative potential and may mark a 
turning point in the history of gender justice activism in Pakistan. As 
feminist scholars and activists, we would be foolish not to take note. 
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Notes 
1 This must be understood within the backdrop of the Cold War, with the Pakistani 
government acting as a bulwark against the Soviet Union in the region and strongly 
supported by the US, and the evolution of the Pakistani state, in which leaders have 
ceded increasing space to conservative forces for political gains. 
2 The Women’s Protection Act (2006) took the teeth out of the Hudood Ordinances by 
placing rape within the jurisdiction of civil law and making it illegal for a woman to be 
convicted of adultery on the basis of her own complaint. 
3 A constitutional provision for a few reserved seats for women in parliament lapsed 
with the 1988 elections. Activists from WAF and some women’s NGOs campaigned for 
their restoration and an increased (33 per cent) quota to include provincial assemblies 
and local government bodies. Between 2000-2002 the government introduced a 33 per 
cent quota for women in local bodies and 17 per cent in the assemblies and Senate. 
4 Legislative Watch newsletters, published by the activist-led NGO Aurat Foundation, 
have been a rich source of information and analysis on all laws affecting women since 
the 1990s. 
5 Activists also took part in the NGO delegation to the UN Conference on Population and 
Development in 1994. 
6 The NGO Applied Socio-Economic Research (ASR) led by Nighat Said Khan has ongoing 
links with women in trade unions and rural women. See: 
http://asr.asrresourcecentre.org/history-rationale). 
7 The Federal Shariat Court was established in 1980 to adjudicate on matters pertaining 
to Islamic law. The Council of Islamic Ideology, established in 1962, is a constitutional 
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body comprised of religious scholars to advise legislators on whether given laws are in 
conformity with the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah. 
8 Formerly Lashkar-e-Taiba, this proscribed group is accused of the 2008 Mumbai 
terrorist attack, amongst others. 
9 Wahhabism, an austere and ultra-conservative form of Islam originating in Saudi 
Arabia, encourages the literal interpretation of the Quran. 
10 Dars refers to gatherings in which ideas about Islam are imparted through lectures and 
discussion. 
11 Nighat Khan (1994) problematises this binary, pointing out that even the so-called 
secular states of Europe and North America are intertwined with religion. She argues in 
Pakistan there is no clear division between those who argue for an Islamic state versus 
those who want a separation of religion and state; rather, there is a spectrum of beliefs 
with regards to the relationship between religion and the state. Farida Shaheed (2009) 
points to the impossibility of separating religion from other aspects of social and 
political life, cautioning against labelling groups as ‘faith’-based which implies those not 
labelled as such have no relationship with religion. 
12 He temporarily suspended support for immunisation after alleged US use of a polio 
vaccinator in its successful hunt for Osama bin Laden, linking it with the cessation of 
drone strikes in the area (Crilly, 2012).  
13 Bureau Report, Dawn, 25 September 2014; 7 December 2013. 
14 Interview with author 
15 The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), population 5 million, are under 
indirect government rule and lie along the western border of KP. Literacy levels are only 
13 per cent for females (Bureau of Statistics 2016, p. iv). 
16 In 2015 alone, 1,390 cases of enforced disappearances were pending with the 
government’s commission of inquiry; there were at least 15 attacks on journalists and 
human rights defenders, and hundreds killed in faith-based attacks against religious 
minority communities and sectarian conflict (HRCP 2016, pp. 4-5, 95-97, 108). More 
recently, Mashal Khan, due to his Marxist and secular sympathies, was killed by fellow 
university students for alleged blasphemy (Khan, 2018). 
17 Society of Landless Peasants of Punjab. 
18 The high-level committee includes no women. A second, but similar, version of the 
Riwaj Act was proposed in 2017 but subsequently withdrawn by government in the face 
of severe criticism. 
19 Author interview with women members of Qabailee Khor, an offshoot of TQK. Also, 
see Naseer (2018). 
20 KhwajaSiras identify either as members of a third gender or as trans-women. Not all 
trans-women in Pakistan identify as KhwajaSira. 
21 In 2017, a transgender man was able to obtain an ID card and passport, which legally 
declared that he was male. 
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